Discussions of a nuclear Iran assume rationality - but what if Teheran becomes a nuclear suicide bomber?
By LOUIS REN? BERESNUCLEAR BOMB 224.88(photo credit: Courtesy)
Political scientists are fond of assuming "rationality." But regarding Iran, neither the US nor Israel has acted in its own self-interest. Each has already allowed a threat to reach a point of possibly no return. For Israel, the cost of inaction could be intolerable harm.
Why? National leaders rely desperately on hope. This misplaced optimism has the emotionally satisfying but strategically injurious effect of blocking productive policies. It may even encourage catastrophic war and terrorism.
Iran continues its march toward nuclear weapons, but neither Israel nor the US has been willing to act preemptively. This will force them to seek safety in the so-called logic of deterrence, ironically making them entirely dependent on the assumption of rationality.
Our leaders will vainly attempt to achieve stable deterrence with Teheran, hoping that a balance of terror can be structured on the US-USSR Cold War model. They will be bitterly disappointed.
Deterrence will likely rest on very weak psychological foundations. For Israel, a principal component of strategic policy has always been to keep its Bomb in the basement, but there will soon be a debate on the wisdom of continued ambiguity.
Arguably, until now, nuclear opacity has worked. Although such ambiguity has done little to deter conventional aggressions or multiple acts of terror, it has succeeded in keeping the country's enemies from mounting existential attacks. These could have been attempted without nuclear or biological weapons because - as strategic theorist Clausewitz wrote - there does come a point when "mass counts."
Israel's enemies have always had an obvious advantage in mass. None of them has the Bomb, but acting collectively, these states and their assorted proxies, even without nuclear weapons, could have inflicted huge harm on the Jewish state.
To be deterred, a fully nuclear Iran would need to know that Israel's nuclear weapons are both invulnerable and capable of penetrating its defenses. Any Iranian judgment about Israel's willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons would depend in part on a foreknowledge of these weapons.
Any Iranian belief that Israel's nuclear weapons are exclusively mega-destructive must be modified. The enemy must be convinced that the Jewish state possesses a range of weapons to meet a range of threats, so the credibility of a deterrent posture could vary inversely with the perceived destructiveness of Israeli arms. In coexisting with an already-nuclear Iran, Israel would thus benefit not from any increased nuclear secrecy, but from expanded nuclear disclosure.
Iran might share some of its nuclear components and materials with Hizbullah or other kindred terrorist groups. To prevent this, Jerusalem would need to convince Iran that it possesses a range of usable nuclear options. Once again, ambiguity might not be sufficiently persuasive.
Ideally, Israel and the US will never allow Iran to become fully nuclear. But failing such prevention, it will not be enough that Israel's enemies know only the basic contours of its nuclear capacity. Jerusalem will need to move to some precise level of disclosure. What will soon need to be calculated is the exact extent of the subtlety with which Israel should communicate its nuclear positions, intentions and capabilities.
Any rationale for nuclear disclosure would rely on the understanding that nuclear weapons can serve Israel's security in a number of ways. Once faced with a nuclear fait accompli in Teheran, Israel would need to convince its principal enemy that it possesses both the will and the weapons to make any intended nuclear aggression more costly than gainful.
But by definition, no move from ambiguity to disclosure would help in the case of an irrational nuclear enemy, in Iran or anywhere else.
To the extent that an Iranian leadership might subscribe to visions of a Shi'ite apocalypse, the country could cast aside all rational behavior. Were this to happen, Iran could effectively become a nuclear suicide-bomber in macrocosm. Such a destabilizing prospect is improbable, but not inconceivable.
To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those that could threaten its existence, Israel must quickly exploit every aspect and function of its still opaque nuclear arsenal. The success of its efforts will depend not only on its selected configuration of "counterforce" and "countervalue" operations, but also on the extent to which this choice is made known in advance to enemy states and their non-state surrogates.
Before such enemies can be deterred from launching first strikes, and before they can be deterred from launching retaliatory attacks following a non-nuclear preemption, it will not be enough to know only that Israel has the Bomb. These enemies will also need to recognize that Israel's nuclear weapons are effectively invulnerable, and that some are pointed at high-value population targets.
Removing the Bomb from the basement could enhance strategic deterrence. Such a calculated end to deliberate ambiguity could also underscore Israel's willingness to use these weapons in reprisal for certain enemy first strikes and retaliatory attacks.
For now, the Bomb should remain ambiguous. But soon, and certainly no later than when Iran is discovered to be close to attaining nuclear weapons, the Jewish state must put an end to ambiguity.
There can never be any reliable peace with a nuclear Iran, barring regime change. If neither Israel nor the US will undertake preemptive destruction of Iran's nuclear program, Israel will have to take its Bomb out of the basement. There are still good reasons to doubt that such a removal would be enough to maintain its deterrence, but it would clearly be better done than left undone. A failure to end nuclear ambiguity at the proper time could also affect US security.
Certain forms of preemption are permissible under international law. These are known correctly as anticipatory self-defense. International law is never a suicide pact.
The writer is the author of many books and articles on nuclear strategy and nuclear war, including recent publications in International Security, Nativ, The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Parameters: The Professional Journal of the US Army War College, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law and The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
if(catID != 151){
var cont = `Take Israel home with the new Jerusalem Post Store
