The Sahel region has become a global hotspot for terrorism, with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) exploiting trans-Saharan smuggling networks to expand their influence.
A recent report from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) highlights how these jihadist groups are leveraging illicit trade routes to sustain their operations, posing a growing threat to North Africa and, ultimately, to Europe.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS have deeply embedded themselves within trans-Saharan smuggling networks, facilitating the movement of weapons, drugs, and militants across the region. Groups such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara collaborate with local actors, particularly in Niger and Mali, to bolster their operations.
This integration not only funds their activities but also provides logistical support crucial for their expansion. The reliance on smuggling networks allows these terrorist organizations to bypass traditional security measures.
The Sahara’s vast and poorly governed spaces offer a sanctuary for jihadist operations, making counterterrorism efforts increasingly difficult without comprehensive regional cooperation.
The entrenchment of terrorist groups in smuggling networks has far-reaching implications.
These groups rely on kidnapping for ransom, often in coordination with local criminal elements, further strengthening their reach.
This growing connectivity between jihadist factions and illicit trade raises the risk of external attacks, with North Africa and Europe as primary targets.
Countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco face significant risks from this expanding jihadist presence.
North African governments have long been concerned about terrorist infiltration through the vast desert borders that separate them from the Sahel.
Libya, a country still grappling with political instability, remains a major weak point, as its ungoverned territories continue to serve as breeding grounds for extremists.
Recent intelligence suggests that JNIM may be shifting its strategy, potentially distancing itself from al-Qaeda to focus on economic objectives within trans-Saharan networks.
If JNIM pursues this course, it could attempt to rebrand as a more localized insurgency rather than an extension of a global jihadist network.
This strategy mirrors those of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, both of which have positioned themselves as nationalist movements rather than international terrorist entities.
However, any ideological shift by JNIM would not necessarily decrease its operational capacity.
Reliance on smuggling for funding
The group’s deep reliance on smuggling for funding ensures that even if it moves away from al-Qaeda, it remains a formidable threat capable of sustaining its activities.
The United States recognizes the Sahel as a key front in global counterterrorism efforts.
Initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership provide vital support to regional governments, enhancing their ability to combat terrorist threats.
American assistance includes training security forces, improving intelligence capabilities, and fostering regional cooperation.
However, US efforts in the Sahel face mounting challenges.
The adaptability of jihadist groups, particularly their reliance on smuggling networks, demands a more comprehensive approach.
While military operations – including drone strikes and special forces missions – target high-value terrorist leaders, a long-term strategy must address underlying factors such as poverty, weak governance, and corruption.
THE EVOLVING security landscape in the Sahel underscores the need for stronger international collaboration.
The US, in partnership with European and African allies, must refine its counterterrorism strategy to combat the interconnected threats of terrorism and organized crime.
Top priorities should be disrupting smuggling networks, strengthening border security, and addressing the socioeconomic vulnerabilities that jihadists exploit.
France, which has historically led counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, faces increasing pushback from regional governments.
Mali and Burkina Faso, for example, have shifted away from Western security assistance in favor of Russian support through the Wagner Group.
This shift has complicated counterterrorism efforts, as Wagner’s presence has been linked to human rights abuses and destabilization tactics that may inadvertently benefit jihadist organizations.
For the US, maintaining close security partnerships with Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria is crucial.
These North African states act as a buffer against the spread of terrorism from the Sahel into the Mediterranean and Europe.
Continued US support, whether in intelligence sharing, military aid, or economic development initiatives, will be vital in preventing further destabilization.
The rise of jihadist groups in the Sahel and their exploitation of trans-Saharan smuggling networks present a growing security challenge that demands sustained and coordinated action.
The US must take action
The US must continue to play a leading role in assisting regional allies in countering these threats.
Military force alone is not sufficient; a broader approach that targets the root causes of instability is necessary to prevent the Sahel from becoming a launching pad for global jihadist operations.
North Africa’s security is inextricably tied to the developments in the Sahel.
As long as terrorist groups exploit illicit trade networks, the risk of their expansion into North Africa and Europe remains dangerously high.
A proactive and cooperative strategy – encompassing military, intelligence, and economic measures – is essential to safeguarding the region from the next major wave of global terrorism.
The writer, a Middle East Forum fellow, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco.