Why did senior security officials falsely believe Hamas was deterred? - opinion

Hamas, on October 7, 2023, sailed into Israel on a wave of perfect calm.As a member of the Hamas Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades Military Council, Ezz al-Din al-Haddad, related, in an interview with Al Jazeera on January 24, “Our attack was meticulously coordinated.... At zero hour, our rocket salvos, drone and glider swarms, and naval units synchronized with thousands... who breached the separation barrier... [which] collapsed at the hands of engineering unit fighters....” The slaughter, destruction, and hostage-taking followed.The front-line IDF troops facing the breaches, doubly reduced because of the Simchat Torah holiday and some other inexplicable reason, numbered perhaps 600 soldiers, most in pajamas. Only 12 tanks were available.The thinking was Hamas was deterred. Even direct proof, provided by the field observation scouts for over a year that Hamas was planning something awful, was dismissed.Tzachi Hanegbi, head of the National Security Council, on October 1, 2023, declared that Hamas was acting in a restrained manner and was indeed deterred. Having been in office for just nine months, obviously he was reflecting the consensus of the advice he received from army officers, even though he took full personal responsibility for the error.NATIONAL SECURITY Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi issues a statement to the media in Tel Aviv, in late October 2023. Just days before the October 7 attacks, he said in an interview: 'Hamas is very, very restrained and understands the implications of further defiance.' (credit: TOMER NEUBERG/FLASH90)Where to start seeking what went wrong? When did it go wrong, and who got it wrong?Writing in the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence last November, Ori Wertman and Christian Kaunert assert that the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate's failed conception caused them not to “perceive Hamas as an existential threat.” In essence, the IDF neither dealt with the potential threat nor planned for all possibilities.The IDF did not “securitize” the Gaza front. Our armed forces were self-blinded a few kilometers from where the Philistines gouged out Samson's eyes in biblical times.Prof. Efraim Karsh predates this development by three decades. In an article in Israel Affairs last October, he describes a post-Oslo process effect whereby the IDF's traditional battle order plan was “emasculated.”Its combative offense ethos morphed into a preference for containment. Its striving for victory was downplayed to “avoid the need for preventive/preemptive measures.” The senior command played along with the politicos. The “disk” needed to be changed, they understood, and so they assumed the desired position.For example, as reported in this newspaper on November 26, 2019, Gadi Eisenkot spoke at the Israel Democracy Institute and declared “Israel is not currently facing an existential threat.” What he did insist on, preferring a nonmilitary aspect of security, was that “the most important element of IDF's strength is the resilience and social cohesion within Israel.”Perhaps the habit and custom of former senior IDF commanders to enter politics affects the last years of their service, at times deleterious to the country's defense requirements.Karsh details how the IDF built itself to, foremost, promote the attainment of peace. Ultimately, this led to the steady reduction of the IDF's ground forces in favor of overwhelming reliance on airpower and sophisticated weaponry.By 1995, based on an International Institute for Strategic Studies report, Karsh found that the IDF's inventory of main battle tanks had dropped from 4,488 to 4,095. But it did not stop there.Six years later, when Ehud Barak finished his short term as prime minister and defense minister, the inventory dropped to 3,900. By the spring of 2013, it was reduced further to 2,442. There was a corresponding decrease, too, in the IDF's fighting formations: from 16 divisions in 1991 (six regular, 10 reserves) to 12 divisions (six regular, six reserves) in 2013.A corresponding decrease in awareness and cognitive sensitivity to what was happening in Gaza seems to have been implanted in the intelligence units. Following the “Oslo disk change” pushed by political echelons and absorbed by the IDF, as well as the Qatar money policy, over the past decade or so, there was a reverse flow of influence.The reports and briefings dulled ministers' abilitiesThe government ministers were being fed, in reports and briefings, the outlook that dulled their abilities to understand what really was happening. A closed circuit evolved that shut off all from acknowledging the reality.Both the defense establishment and, subsequently, the political echelons began a dangerous tango. Following the ground forces depletion, an overdependence on air support appeared. In 2017, former Israel Air Force commander Maj.-Gen. Amir Eshel (ret.) stated at a security studies conclave that Israel's air power remains its most generic military force.Israel's air force, he noted, has the “flexibility to deal with multiple fronts quickly and simultaneously,” adding, “speed still has a significance.” When threats appear, “the solution of air power... arrives within minutes to hours,” Eshel then stated. As we know, hours passed on Oct. 7 before any effective air support of jets or helicopters arrived.IS IT possible Herzi Halevi, Aviv Kochavi, Eisenkot, Gabi Ashkenazi, and Benny Gantz, the General Staff chiefs since the Disengagement, did not prepare the army for the possibility of an invasion? Or that they were incapable of doing so?Halevi, to recall, served as head of the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Southern Command just prior to his controversial appointment as IDF commander.Moreover, Halvei oversaw the construction of the Gaza “smart” border fence, 6 meters high and 65 km. long, fitted with sophisticated sensors and remote-operated machine guns. He preferred an overdependence on things, technology, and a communications network system that collapsed within minutes. And he has been appointing new senior officers from among those who failed on Oct. 7.It took Halevi almost three weeks to launch the counteroffensive. Could it be that he did not even expect the IDF would need to retake the Gaza Strip? Did the General Staff ever dedicate itself to planning for that possibility?Franz-Stefan Gady, a fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is convinced the IDF's “military tech fetish is a failed strategy” and “created an illusion of safety.” Where does this leave us in the post-Oct. 7 age?The writer is a researcher, analyst, and commentator on political, cultural, and media issues.

Why did senior security officials falsely believe Hamas was deterred? - opinion

It took Halevi almost three weeks to launch the counteroffensive. Could it be that he did not even expect the IDF would need to retake the Gaza Strip, or ever dedicate the IDF to planning for it?

French man beaten while returning from mikveh

Efrat leader: Building de facto West Bank sovereignty

Why did senior security officials falsely believe Hamas was deterred? - opinion

It took Halevi almost three weeks to launch the counteroffensive. Could it be that he did not even expect the IDF would need to retake the Gaza Strip, or ever dedicate the IDF to planning for it?

See more on