When the order went out to fire Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) chief Ronen Bar, the reason behind it was personal, not professional, and the result of Bar’s loyalty to the organization and not to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the intelligence chief wrote in his affidavit to the High Court of Justice on Monday.
“To this day, the reason for my firing is unclear to me. But the developments that took place over the last few months indicate one thing: The decision to fire me was consolidated at some point in 2024. This decision was not rooted in [lack of] professionalism but resulted from Netanyahu’s expectation that I would be personally loyal to him,” Bar wrote. This is what brought about the decision to push him out, coinciding with a “well-timed campaign” against Bar and the agency, he added.
Bar addressed several accusations: the agency’s failure on October 7 and the mistakes that led to it; the investigations into figures close to Netanyahu; a lack of trust between Netanyahu and Bar; the prime minister’s criminal trial testimony; and anti-government protests.
The High Court of Justice ordered the two to submit affidavits in an attempt to reach a compromise that would not involve breaching a governmental decision, in a hearing on April 8. If no compromise is reached, the court said, it would issue a decision. The government is set to submit its own affidavit on Thursday.
These tensions are the culmination of months of clashes between the court, the Attorney-General’s Office – which opposes the dismissal – and the government, headed by Netanyahu.
Hamas planned October 7 'under Israel's nose'
Bar wrote how Hamas was built up, brick by brick, right under Israel’s nose. This, he said, was made possible due to Qatari funding and a particular defense policy. This is all outlined in a classified document that Bar submitted along with his affidavit.
The Shin Bet has a lot of power and therefore can only act on a very particular criteria of dangers: illegal, secretive activities with a potential for violence. Anything outside of this definition, Bar wrote, does not fall under the agency’s purview. If anything, it would fall within the domain of the police. In gray area situations, where Bar and the agency were unsure how to act, they sought counsel with the Attorney-General’s Office to make sure that any action taken would be limited to the very precise needs of the Shin Bet, and not traverse beyond that.
Bar wrote that he received requests from the prime minister that contradicted this doctrine.
He added that these requests were made by Netanyahu at the end of work meetings, after the military secretary and transcriber had left the room.
Bar addressed claims that the agency knew of the planned October 7 massacre and did not properly update Netanyahu on the situation: “Nothing less than lies, which act to incite against me and the agency,” he wrote.
He wrote that the Shin Bet had warned in 2023 that “Our enemies are sensing that the timing is prime” for an attack, given the deep societal rift in Israel surrounding the judicial reform legislation push. He said the agency had alerted, “We might find ourselves in a ‘complete storm.’”
Bar listed two dates in April and June 2023 when the Shin Bet had acted, recommending a series of preemptive strikes in the former, and warning of war in the latter, on the same night that the Knesset voted on the controversial reasonableness clause.
Netanyahu has said that on October 5, Bar had suggested continuing with the containment policy regarding Hamas. Bar did not address this. He wrote that widespread warnings were dispatched to everyone on the night preceding October 7, and that updates were passed on accordingly. He specified that all government and security bodies were given an exceptional warning regarding Hamas and its attack plans at 3:03 a.m.
Bar said that the agency had failed in its warnings in this regard, but that absolutely nothing was hidden.
Investigations against figures close to the prime minister
At the heart of the matter are two investigations that the intelligence agency is pursuing against figures close to the prime minister.
The first is the leaked documents case, in which former Netanyahu spokesman Eli Feldstein leaked classified military documents to the German daily Bild in an effort to sway public opinion on the hostage negotiations. The second, Qatargate, concerns Qatari influence on and connections to Feldstein and Netanyahu aides Yonatan Urich and Israel Einhorn, with the aim of upgrading Qatar’s image in the eyes of the Israeli public.
Bar described a symbiotic, positive relationship between the Shin Bet and Netanyahu until November 2024 – when, he has consistently claimed, things changed, a timeline that coincides with the leaking of the classified documents.The Qatargate investigation was underway before Netanyahu began seeking to fire Bar in earnest.
“A suspicion, however light, that people employed by a Hamas-supporting state are front-and-center at the Israeli decision-making deck, especially if they are suspected of acts of influence, must be investigated, especially when said state [Qatar] is a mediator between Israel and Hamas,” Bar wrote. He added that the timing of the campaign against him with that of these investigations cannot be a coincidence.
Netanyahu's trial
Bar wrote that he refused to provide a legal opinion that would prevent Netanyahu from giving consistent testimony in his criminal trial hearings. Bar said he had been pressured to sign a document written by the prime minister’s team stating that the testimonies should be completely private. He refused to sign it.
Bar actually gave an opinion that convinced the Jerusalem District Court to move the standard hearing proceedings to the more secure location in the Tel Aviv District Court – which is unprecedented.
Protests for the hostages
The government charged on April 5, in a letter to the High Court, that Bar “refused to act against an organized plan to perpetuate mass service refusal within the IDF, threatening Israel’s security.”
“This represents perfectly their approach regarding the powers of the Shin Bet and who it is supposed to serve,” according to Bar’s affidavit. Netanyahu told Bar several times that he expected the agency to operate against civilians involved in protests against the government and its policies, Bar wrote.
Protests against the government began after Justice Minister Yariv Levin announced his contentious judicial reform legislation plans, continuing throughout the issue, and then taking on the form of protests for the hostages captured on October 7. Since then, the investigations have fueled some to view the government as having lost its mandate.
Several people have actually been indicted for going too far in protests; at issue is the request for surveillance.
Bar noted, “It was made clear to me” that in the case of a judicial clash regarding the protest movement, the expectation was that Bar would be obedient to the prime minister – not to the High Court.
Lack of trust
Netanyahu has said that the breach of trust with Bar began on the morning of October 7, when “He didn’t wake me up.”
Bar insists that it only began in November, stacking up the events that led to the breach of trust differently. “The claim of ‘lack of trust’ is related to events that are far from the truth and are really due to my refusal to crack under his pressure” and to affect his [Bar’s] testimony obligations, Bar wrote.
Following this were the investigations and Bar’s support for a State Commission of Inquiry. “This sequence of events, and only this, is what drove the demand for my sudden dismissal,” he affirmed.
The government also gave different accounts as to when the trust between them began to crack, Bar wrote. “I didn’t know about this until I was informed of my dismissal, and even then, it was without explanation.”
PMO’s response to the affidavit
The Prime Minister’s Office responded soon after the affidavit, denying most of its contents. “Ronen Bar’s affidavit is riddled with falsehoods and highlights his failures,” it said.
The PMO said that Bar did not wake Netanyahu or then-defense minister Yoav Gallant to apprise them of the situation in the early hours of October 7.
Bar wrote that he asked his chief of staff to alert Netanyahu at 5:15 a.m.
“In reality, Bar’s chief of staff only contacted the military secretary at 6:13 a.m., mere minutes before Hamas launched its attack. At that point, Bar had been in possession of information suggesting a possible attack for more than three hours,” the PMO said.
It added, “Without intending to, Bar’s affidavit supports the government’s argument that plans for his dismissal were made public in November 2024. This directly contradicts the Attorney-General’s assertion that Bar’s firing in February was in response to the launch of the Qatargate investigation. The dismissal was not meant to block an investigation [rather], it was launched in an effort to prevent the dismissal.”
The PMO’s response did not address the April – and June – 2023 warnings.
Regarding the trial, the PMO said, “The prime minister never sought to delay his trial. In fact, he insisted it proceed without delay.”
It also accused Bar of not taking significant action to suppress violent and dangerous rhetoric against Netanyahu.
Bar concluded, “This affidavit is my duty to whoever follows in my footsteps, so that they can do their job professionally,” warning that however this saga ends, it will affect the future of Israel’s intelligence agency.
He added that writing such a letter was not easy for him and came at a grave cost to himself and to the agency.
“But, with what has happened, and out of a deep concern for Israel in general and to the Shin Bet’s functionality in particular,” he said he considered it correct to tell his side of the story.
Yonah Jeremy Bob contributed to this report.